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Between Consensus and Citizens:
Public Participation in
Technology Assessment in France
France is often regarded as the typical
example of technocratic governance,
where decisions about science and tech-
nology.are made by a political and engi-
neering elite, without public consulta-
tion. Yet in 1998 a Citizens' Conference
was held in France, based on the model
of Consensus Conferences developed in
Denmark to encourage public participa-
tion in technology assessment. This pa-
per will ~rgue that although this event
signalled a turning point in the relation-
ship between French institutions and
the public with regard to science and
technology issues, the implementation
of the conference clearly reflected the
traditional dimensions of French tech-
nocracy.
Consensus conferences are a model
for participatory technology assessment
developed and promoted by the Danish
Board of Technology (DBI, 1999; Joss
and Durant, 1995).A group of approxi-
mately 15ordinary citizens are selected
and given information on the subject at
stake during two preparatory weekends.
At the end of the second weekend the
citizen panel elaborates a set of ques-
tions and selects the experts they want
to consult. A third weekend constitutes
the "conference" itself, when the panel
cross-examines the experts in front of an
invited public audience, usually com-
posed of media and interested parties.
According to Grundahl, one of the pro-
tagonists ofthe model, the aim is "to cre-
ate an enlightened dialogue between
expert and lay panel- on the lay panel's
premises" (Grundahl, 1995: 31). After
two days of debate, the panel retires for
approximately 24hours to write a report
with their conclusions and recommen-
dations. These are submitted to parlia-
ment and reported in the media. Aman-
agement committee defines the subject
of the conference, co-ordinates the se-
lection of the panel, chooses the persons
who will participate in the preparatory
sessions, and provides the panel with a
list of experts to choose from. The first
consensus conference was held in Den-
mark in 1987and another 17 have been
held in that country since then. The
model has been taken up in a number
of other countries, and at least 19 con-
sensus conferences have taken place
outside Denmark by the end of 1999 (see
Table 1).
Most analyses of these events have
been conducted by researchers and
practitioners closely involved with the
organisation and promotion of consen-
sus conferences, and has focused essen-
tially on practical considerations (e.g.
Joss and Durant, 1995). Critics have fo-
cused on two dimensions: the link with
policy making and the legitimacy of dif-
ferent kinds of knowledge. For example
Purdue, is his analysis of the UK consen-
sus conference on plant biotechnology
held in 1994, raised the following crucial
questions: "Who is consulted? Who par-
ticipates?Who decides who is consulted
and who participates?Who decides what
the issues are that people shall be con-
sulted on? What counts as relevant
knowledge and expertise? Is anyone ob-
ligated to pay attention to the consulta-
tion, or is the simple process of staging
a consultation considered sufficient?"
(Purdue, 1995: 170). Purdue and others
have argued that the model itself, and
certainly the way in which it was applied
in the UK, reinforces the distinction be-
tween "expert" and "lay" knowledge
(Barns, 1995; Fixal, 1997; Levidow, 1998;
Purdue, 1995 and 1996). These authors
conclude that, in contradiction with the
stated aims ofthe procedure, consensus
conferences tend to de-Iegitimatise non-
scientific discourse. The model is pro-
moted in Denmark as a method to open
up the decision process to a greater va-
riety of world-views. Critics, on the other
hand, argue that consensus conferences
have been used to promote a science-
based definition of the decisions at stake
in the wider social sphere, especially
when the Danish protocol has been ex-
ported unaltered to other societal con-
texts. Levidow (1998) developed this cri-
tique by stating that instead of "democ-
ratizing technology", the UK consensus
conference represented an attempt to
"technologize democracy". We shall see
that this critique is relevant to the French
experience.
1994. Why was there such sudden enthu-
siasm in these countries for public par-
ticipation in technology assessment?
And why was the topic of genetically
modified food so prevalent?
One explanation is that new develop-
ments in genetics since the early 1980s
pose new ethical and social questions
which proVide good subjects for societal
deliberation and citizen participation in
decision making. They are typical exam-
ples of "science meets society" prob-
lems. This was indeed recognised by the
Danish Board of Technology when it
chose the subject for their first consen-
sus conference, which was "gene tech-
nology in industry and agriculture". This
was, however, at a time (1987) when ge-
Consensus Conferences on
Genetically Modified Food
It is interesting to note that a very high
proportion of consensus conferences
held around the world have related to
genetics, and in particular to the use of
genetic technologies in food and agricul-
ture (see Table 1). It is also noticeable
that this has almost always been the
topic chosen for the first conference held
in a country. Overail12 out the 19 con-
ferences held outside Denmark have
been about genetic technologies, and
most of these (10) have been about the
use of GMOs in food and agriculture.
Indeed the very first conference in Den-
mark was also on gene technology and
4 others have been held on related sub-
jects in that country. It is also particu-
larly striking to see how consensus con-
ferences on the theme of genetically
modified food have proliferated
throughout the world between 1996 and
1999. In this period, consensus s;onfer-
ences about GM food were held in 8 new
countries. In each case it was the first
time that they were experimenting with
the procedure, or indeed with any form
of participatory technology assessmentl•
The UK also chose this topic for its first
consensus conference, slightly earlier, in
netic technologies were still at an early
stage of development, and choices about
the possibilities and consequences of
technological development were still, to
some extent, open-ended. The context
surrounding genetically modified food
in 1996 was very different. Research con-
ducted specifically with the aim of pro-
ducing agricultural crops had been con-
ducted in laboratories since at least
1983, which was when the first geneti-
cally modified plant was produced; and
1996 was the first year when genetically
modified crops were produced on a
large-scale and arrived on the world
market (mostly soya, maize and cotton
grown in the USA). Thus, these recent
consensus conferences on GMOs were
Year Country Subject
1993 Netherlands Genetic modification of animals
1994 United Kingdom Plant biotechnology
1995 Netherlands Human genetics research
1996 Netherlands Management of nature reserves
1996 New Zealand Plant biotechnology
1996 Norway Genetically modified food
1997 Austria Ozone pollution by car traffic
1997 United States Telecommunications and democracy
1998 France GMOs in agriculture and food
1998 Japan Gene therapy
1998 Korea Genetically modified food
1998 Switzerland Electricity production
1999 Australia Genetically modified food
1999 Canada Food Biotechnology
1999 Switzerland Genetic engineering and food
1999 New Zealand Biotechnological pest control
1999 Korea Cloning
1999 Japan High information society
1999 United Kingdom Disposal of nuclear waste
held after key technological and com-
mercial decisions had already been
taken and citizens were faced with the
products of the technology, literally, on
their plates. This seems rather different
from the original aim of such confer-
ences, as promoted by the Danish Board
ofTechnology,which was to givelaypeo-
ple the opportunity to assess the poten-
tial impacts of technological develop-
ments before they are finalised.
Social science researchers have ob-
served that public agencies tend to en-
courage novel forms of collective man-
agement onlywhen faced with problems
which can no longerbe dealt with bysci-
entific expertise alone., According to
Lascoumes (1996), this is particularly
and increasingly the case with regard to
environmental and health issues which
are cross-sectorial and involve a com-
plex mix of institutions. For Lascoumes,
in these sectors
the entanglement of different stakes,
the cross-sector nature ofprogrammes,
the horizontal dimension of public ac-
tion, and the heterogeneity of the ac-
tors concerned have become an endur-
ing feature, including in domains
where compartmentalisation, mo-
nopolies by a grand corps" and a hier-
archical administration system were
the rule until now. (Lascoumes, 1996:
330).
This, indeed, describes rather accurately
the situation surrounding genetically
modified food in the late 1990s. Unlike
other major technological innovations
(e.g. nuclear power), food production
and distribution involves numerous and
diverse actors throughout the food
chain: farmers, seed companies, food
manufacturers and distributors, bio- ,
technology firms, research scientists etc.
Each of these groups have their own
vested interests and their own specific
relationship with citizens and consum-
ers. Agricultural policy is also a key and
visible feature of government policy
which can affect voting behaviour and
farmer protest movements. Further-
more, food products are something that
citizens are in contact with everyday and
about which they have some - relative-
direct choice. Citizens have therefore
been able to influence decisions about
GM food through their behaviour as
consumers and voters as well as through
their role as environmental activists. In
addition, debates about the risks asso-
ciated with GMOshave revolved around
issues of uncertainty, ecological uncer-
tainty, and the potential for long term
and irreversible harmful effects (Stirling,
1999). For all these reasons, previously
established institutional procedures for
the introduction of technological inno-
vations into the socio-economic sphere
failed to function smoothly for agricul-
tural GMOs.By1997the introduction of
GMOs into the French, European, and
other markets was seriously compro-
mised: environmental and consumers
non-governmental organisations had
launched active and largely successful
public campaigns against GMOs; regu-
latory policy on GMOs was in total dis- -
array; and food manufacturers and dis-
tributors were promising their clients
that they would not use GM products
even when they were authorised (Levi-
dow, 1999;Marris, 2000a and b). It there-
fore became clear that new forms of de-
cision-making needed to be explored,
and that these would have to incorpo-
rate a wider range of stakeholders.
The proliferation of consensus con-
ferences about agricultural GMOs dur-
ing 1996-1999 in countries which had
not shown much interest in participative
technology assessment does not, there-
fore, necessarily reflect a sudden world-
wide enthusiasm from public policy
makers for citizen input into decision-
making on science and technology is-
sues. Instead, it suggests that consensus
conferences have been used in those
countries as a tool to address public con-
troversies that could not be resolved us-
ing established institutional processes.
It seems that they have been seen by
public institutions as a way to resolve
existing conflicts and to extricate them-
selves from difficult political and eco-
nomic impasses, rather than as a
method to promote an early public de-
bate about societal choices for the future
trajectory of agricultural biotechnolo-
gies. Furthermore, consensus confer-
ences became suddenly popular espe-
cially in countries where there had been
very little public debate about GMOs
prior to 1996, and were promoted only
when a public controversy became ap-
parent. Indeed, even the conference on
GMOsheld in Denmark in 1987occurred
follOWinga public debate initiated by
non-governmental organisations. Aswe
shall see, all of these points are particu-
larly relevant in the French context.
French Policy on Agricultural GMOs:
an Impasse Is Reached
By the summer of 1997, French public
policy on agricultural GMOswas in to-
tal disarray and this had important eco-
nomic and political implications
(Marris, 2000a). This surprised many
stakeholders, because until 1996all po-
tential conflict seemed to have been re-
solved, in France, through the construc-
tion of an apparently effective "science-
based" regulatory system (Gotweiss,
1998;Roy,2000; Roy and Ioly, 2000). In
'contrast to some other European coun-
tries, notably Denmark, Germany, and
the Netherlands, public policy was
broadly supportive toward the develop-
ment of agricultural biotechnologies;
the media showed very little interest in
the topic; there were no significant cam-
paigns by French non-governmental or-
ganisations (NGOs) representing envi-
ronmental or consumer interests; no
debate in agricultural circles; and no vis-
ible controversy among scientists about
the risks associated with GMOs. Thus
France was, until 1997, the European
Union (EU)Member State favoured by
applicants for both experimental and
commercial releases of GMOs into the
environment.
Given this seemingly positive back-
ground and well-structured regulatory
system, Ciba-Geigy (which later fused
with Sandoz to become Novartis) chose
France as the gatewayJor their first ap-
plication to market a GMOin the EU. In
1994,this biotechnology company sub-
mitted an application for an insect- and
herbicide-resistant genetically modified
maize variety, referred to as !'Btl76". The
French authorities supported the appli-
cation and forwarded it to other EU
Member States, following the rules laid
down by EU legislation (CEC, 1990).
Seven members raised objections to this
proposal and this led to lengthy pro-
tracted negotiations between the Euro-
pean Commission and the European
Council, including referral of the case to
three European level expert committees.
But these failed to resolve the conflict.
In the end, at a European Council of En-
vironmental Ministers held inTune 1996,
France was the only Member State to
vote in favour of the proposal (13 voted
against and one abstained). Despite this
opposition, the European Commission
still decided, in accordance with EU leg-
islation, to authorise the commerciali-
sation ofBtl76 maize in December 1996.
Once the Commission had given its ap-
proval France, as the original notifier for
the proposal, was expected to ratify this
decision by national law. However, to-
tally unexpectedly, the French Govern-
ment decided in February 1997 to au-
thorise the commercialisation of Bt 176
maize but not its cultivation in France
(Marris, 2000a). This decision meant that
the commercial release, Le. import, sale
and consumption, of the maize was au-
thorised throughout the EU, including
France, but that cultivation was prohib-
ited in France. It was criticised from all
sides as being incoherent: by environ-
mental and consumer NGOs; farmers
unions; other professional agricultural
institutions; and agro-food, seed and
biotechnology companies. The next day
Axel Khan resigned. He had been Chair
of the Commission du Genie Biomole-
culaire (CGB), the expert committee
which had evaluated and supported the
application, since its inception in 1986.
This signalled an important breach in
the relationship between experts and
public decision-makers, which had un-
til then followed a linear model founded
on delegation of responsibility from
politicians to experts (Roy,2000; Roy and
Joly, 2000).
The Government Decides to Launch
a Public Debate on GMOs
In May 1997, parliamentary elections
were held and the Government changed
from centre-right to left-green. In No-
vember 1997, following consultations
with major stakeholders, in particular
environmental NGOs, the new Govern-
ment announced its policy line on
GMOs. It had decided that "in order to
relieve the incoherence of the previous
Government" it would authorise the cul-
tivation of Btl76 maize in France (Min-
istry of Agriculture, 1997). Within the
same press release, the Government also
announced that it would "launch a pub-
lic debate" on GMOs, using the Danish
model of consensus conferences. In the
meantime, "until scientific studies dem-
onstrate the absence of risk for the envi-
ronment and until this public debate is
completed", no further authorisations
for genetically modified plants other
than maize would be approved. At the
same time, the Government also an-
nounced a number of measures related
to the regulation of GMOs: a new expert
committee for "biovigilance" would be
created to follow the environmental and
health impacts of the commercial culti-
vation ofBtl76 maize in France; the ex-
pert committee responsible for the
evaluation of risks associated with the
release for GMOs into the environment,
the CGB, would be reformed, in particu-
lar to make it more open to consumer
and environmental NGOs; and "con-
sumer information would be assured
through precise labelling". In practice,
this simply meant that existing legisla-
tion would be applied: GMOs would be
labelled, as would products containing
GMOs - but only if they were not con-
sidered to be "identical" to traditional
products (Le. "substantially equivalent",
as defined by EU legislation).
These declarations demonstrated that
the Government perceived GMOs as a
source of political controversy and that
it was determined tobe seen to be seri-
ously addressing key issues in the pub-
lic debate. The numerous measures an-
nounced simultaneously at this press
conference were clearly intended to set,
out an innovative trend in public policy
on GMOs. This strategy appeared to fail,
however, since it was the decision to au-
tho rise the cultivation of the Novartis
Btl76 genetically modified maize which
was perceived by industry and NGOs
alike as the strongest statement with re-
gard to governmental policy on GMOs.
This was also the main feature which
was discussed in the press (Lemarie et
al.,2000).
At the time ofthe announcement, the
stakes were high for the Government
because it had to make important and
urgent decisions about pending applica-
tions for EU level commercialisation of
other GMOs. As mentioned above, most
EU level applications for marketing of
GMOs prior to 1996 were submitted in
France. In 1997 -98, several of these were
accepted by the European Commission
but, as a final step in the legislative pro-
cedure, had to be ratified by France. By
not processing the appropriate decrees,
France was blocking the import of these
GM lines in the whole of the EU. The
pressure from the European Commis-
sion to ratify these authorisations was
high, as was the political and economic
pressure from the United States with re-
gard to the importation of genetically
modified products into the EU (see for
example Schumacher, 1998). The possi-
bility that the USA might complain to the
World Trade Organisation (WIO) about
the EU refusal to import GMOs was also
very much in the minds of government
officials, especially given the ongoing
WTO involvement in controversies at
thar time about bananas from ex-Euro-
pean colonies and American llormone-
treated beeffrom the USA. However, de-
spite much corridor speculatio n, to date
no complaint has been lodged by the
USA at the WIO regarding the iimport of
,GMOs into the EU.
The -reputation of the new Govern-
ment as a whole was also threatened,
and in particular the viability of the frag-
ile left-green coalition, since the Green
party had clearly declared itself against
GMOs prior to the elections (the new
Minister of Environment, Dominique
Voynet, was the head of the Gre en party).
In order to demonstrate unanimity, the
November 1997 announcement was'
made at a press conference which
brought together an unusually broad
spectrum of senior government repre-
sentatives: the Prime Minister, three
Ministers (Agriculture, Environment and
Health), and the Secretary of State for
Consumer Affairs. Controversy about
the role of the Greens in this decision
was, however, not avoided: it was chal-
lenged immediately from within the
party.
In this difficult international context,
the consensus conference provide,d the
Government with a way to legitimately
delay immediate action, while at the
same time promising that decisions
would be taken as soon as the public
debate was completed (Ioly, 2000). The
conference was also expected to reveal
to the US administration that public
opinion in France was truly different to
that in the USA, and therefore that the
French Government's reluctance to al-
low US imports of GMOs was not due to
economic protectionism. On the other
hand, this resulted in a very tight time-
schedule for the consensus conference:
the Government promised that the con-
sultation exercise would be completed
before July 1998, fearing that the USA
would not be prepared to wait any longer
than that. Thus, the conference was or-
ganised in just six months, whereas ap-
proximately 12 months are generally
considered necessary by the Danish
Board of Technology. This also meant
that the conference had to be held in
June, during the final frenzy of the Foot-
ball World Cup which was in France that
year and just as the majority of the
French population was about to depart
on extended summer holidays. This un-
fortunate timing was latched upon by
NGO critics. To make things worse, in
terms of media attention to the confer-
ence, the French team unexpectedly
made it all the way to the final and won
the Cup.
It was in this policy context that the
idea of a consensus conference emerged
on the public scene in France, and this
obviously influenced the reactions of all
stakeholders. The Government was criti-
cised from all sides for organising a pub-
lic debate after it had already take~ a key
decision in favour of the technology.
Many environmental and consumer
NGOs made this point in public. For ex-
ample, a document produced by the
non-governmental organisation Agir
pour l'Environnement in collaboration
with seven other environmental, farmer
and consumer pressure groups (includ-
ing Greenpeace, Ecoropa and the Con-
federation Paysannes) stated that:
By announcing simultaneously the
start of a public debate on GMOs ... and
the authorisation to cultivate the first
GMmaize, the French Government has
adopted an unacceptable strategy of
fait accompli. It implies that public
consultation is simply an accompany-
ing measure which aims to make ac-
ceptable a decision which has already
been pronounced upon. ("GMOwarn-
ing!", undated document, approxi-
mately March 1998).
Social science researchers and key actors
interested in public participation in
technology assessment also published
commentaries insisting on this point
(Assouline, 1998; Legrand, 1998). Indus-
try representatives also felt that the tim-
ing jeopardised the validity of the con-
sensus conference but did not express
this view in public.
Public opinion remains undecided and
seems insufficiently informed. While
our co-citizens are ready to accept. the
use of genetic modification for the pro-
duction of medicines, they are reticent
to accept it for their food. Despite the
great scientific experience in the field
of genetic engineering, citizens refuse
that decisions that entail the future be
taken without the expression and con-
frontation of all opinions. (... ) [consen-
sus conferences are] a form of partici-
patory debate between citizens and ex-
perts on questions associated with sci-
entific and technological development.
They aim to reintegrate citizens into the
heart of the debate by creating favour-
able conditions for a dialogue that al-
lows an understanding of the com-
plexities of the stakes, the emergence
of possible points of agreement and
disagreement, and of uncertainties.
(Prime Minister's Office, 1997)
In the quote, it is unclear who is sup-
posed to understand the complexities,
and who is supposed to agree or disa-
gree with whom. Throughout the press
releases, the only people mentioned as
actors in the process are the citizen
panel and the invited experts (and the
steering committee). Furthermore, al-
though consensus conferences were re-
ferred to by the Government as a "new
way of elaborating decisions" and as a
means to implement "participatory de-
mocracy" (Ministry of Agriculture, 1997),
no statement was made about the link
between the conference and the deci-
sion making process. Indeed, the precise
link between parliamentary decision-
making and consensus conferences re-
mains a moot point for this method of
participatory technology assessment
(see Joss, 1998, for an analysis of this link
in Denmark). In the French case, the
Government press releases focused on
"debate" "information" and "dialogue"
The Government View of the
Consensus Conference
A small group of high-ranking civil serv-
ants were behind this initiative, from the
ministries of Agriculture and Environ-
ment, and from the Prime Ministers of-
fice. They perceived the consensus con-
ference as a convenient tool to help the
Government out of a difficult political
and economic impasse created by pub-
lic opposition to genetically modified
food products. It would help to demon-
strate that the Government took the
views of the public seriously. At the same
time, the structured and pret-a-porter
dimension of the model was attractive.
They felt reassured that previous expe-
riences in other countries demonstrated
that the debate would not get out of
hand. Rather, the conference would
reestablish the legitimate role of govern-
ment in a field that had until then been
delegated to experts and "invaded" by
NGOs. The press release from the Prime
Minister's office described the process as
follows:
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between experts and citizens. The omis-
sion of any statement about the link be-
tween the conference and decision-
making was particularly striking be-
cause, unlike other consensus confer-
ences elsewhere in the world (e.g. in the
UK in 1994), in this case it was the Gov-
ernment itself which was clearly and ex-
plicitly the instigator of the whole proc-
ess. Thus the press releases stated that:
"The Government has decided [0 launch
a public debate on GMOs", but made
absolutely no reference to what the Gov-
ernment intended to do with tme recom-
mendations of the citizen panel. The
statements regarding the outco me ofthe
process focused solely on the produc-
tion of the lay panel's report and its take
up by the press. Indeed, apart from these
two press releases issued in November
1997, the Government made no further
public statements about the consensus
conference process itself, and never ex-
plicitly responded to the panel's recom-
mendations. It very consciously adopted
an arm's length attitude and delegated
the running of the conference [0 the Of-
fice Parlementaire de l'Evaluation des
Choix Scientifiques et Technologiques
(OPECST), claiming that this institution
had the necessary strong legitimacy and
credibility, based upon its independence
and neutrality (Ministry of Ar;riculture,
1997).
By asking the 0 PEeST to organise the
conference, the Government intended
to make a clear distinction between the
executive and parliamentary arms of the
political system. Thus, although Govern-
ment ministers clearly took the decision
that the conference should take place
and announced this in their November
press conference, they then took no re-
sponsibility for the process or the out-
come. It was to be organised independ-
ently from them, and would report solely
to parliament. The official decision to
ask the OPECSTto organise the confer-
ence was taken by the lower house of
parliament on 3rd December 1997. On
its side, the OPECSTwas also very keen
to emphasise its independence from the
political system. The Office insisted, as
a condition for taking on the running of
the conference, that the Government
should have no influence on the proc-
ess, including for example the choice of
members of the steering committee and
of the persons who would take part in
the preparatory weekends. This inde-
pendence suited both parties very well,
but meant that the link between the con-
ference and decision-making was weak-
ened.
The OPECSTwas set up in 1983as a par-
liamentary officewhich followsmodel of
the (nowdefunct) USAOfficeofTechnol-
ogyAssessment, but on a much smaller
scale. It is similar to other European par-
liamentary offices for technology'assess-
ment, including the Danish Technology
Board. It is however interesting to note
the use of the word "choice",rather than
"assessment", in its title. It is a non-par-
tisan parliamentary advisory body, com-
posed in equal parts of members of the
upper and lower houses of parliament
(16of each), and with equal representa-
tion from right and left wing parties, re-
gardless of the composition of parlia-
ment at the time. A representative from
the Green Partywas included for the first
time in 1998.The mission of the OPECST
is to "inform parliament on the conse-
quences of its choices which have a sci-
entific or technological dimension in or-
der to enlighten its decisions" (OPECST,
2000).The Officeputs great emphasis on
the fact that it is totally independent
from government and its civilservice de-
partments. Either chamber can submit
topics to the office for investigation. A
rapporteur is chosen among the mem-
bers of the office, who conducts the
study and submits his report for ap-
proval to the members of the Office.The
principal method for technology assess-
ment employed by the OPECSTconsists
of private auditions of experts. In addi-
tion, it has developed a model for "Pub-
lic Auditions" which involves cross-ex-
amination of experts in front of an in-
vited audience of journalists.
In May 1996, the socialist group in
parliament (then in opposition) submit-
ted a request to the OPECSTfor a study
on the theme "from knowledge about
genes to their use". But it was not until
the autumn of 1997,when the GMO is-
sue had become a source of political
controversy, that the office actually be-
gan to work on this topic. Significantly,
the subject was reduced in scope from
genetic technologies in general to "the
use of GMOs in agriculture and food".
Jean-YvesLeDeaut, a socialist Member
of Parliament, was appointed as rappor-
teur for this study. He conducted the
GMOinquiry using the usual procedures
of the Office, namely private auditions
of experts and a two-day Public Audition
held in May 1998.Over 200 people were
auditioned between December 1997and
June 1998. The full transcripts of the
Public Auditions were published
(LeDeaut, 1998a).Experts consulted in-
cluded scientists as well as representa-
tives of industry, farming, consumer and
environmental institutions. Most of
these consultations took place in France,
but Le Deaut also travelled to Austria,
Switzerland' and the USAfor this study.
In December 1997,LeDeaut was also
charged with organising the consensus
conference. This meant that it was in ef-
fect tagged-on as an additional proce-
dure within the broader consultation ex-
ercise. It also meant that the conference
was strongly marked by the personality
ofLe Deaut. President of the OPECSTin
1998and on several previous occasions,
he had been a member and great advo-
cate of the Office since its inception. He
also proudly claims the credit for insti-
gating Public Auditions as a method for
technology assessment in France. The
fact that the conference ended up being
portrayed by the OPECSTand the Gov-
ernment as an add-on to ongoing pro-
cedures reflected two important ambi-
guities. Firstly, the Office felt the need to
defend the technology assessment meth-
ods it had used until then. Thus, they
gave equal importance to all three pro-
cedures used and merged them into a
single consultation exercise (private and
public auditions of experts, and the con-
sensus conference). Moreover, the audi-
tions were used to frame the issues to be
dealt with by the citizen panel. For ex-
ample, in their letter to the "teachers"
selected for the preparatory weekends,
the steering committee listed the themes
that should be addressed, "even if they
seem to you unimportant or complex",
pointing out that these had been estab-
lished on the basis of the private audi-
tions conducted by LeDeaut (OPECST,
1998b). Also, the list provided to the
panel for their selection of experts to in-
vite to the conference was to be drawn
from the list of experts auditioned by
LeDeaut.
Secondly, the Office is an inherent
part of the parliamentary political sys-
tem and its members are, by definition,
committed to a representative model of
democracy. This was, indeed, ane ofthe
main reasons why they, and the Govern-
ment, rejected a first proposal for a con-
sensus conference on GMOs a few
months earlier (Assoulineand Toly,1997;
Joly,2000). They felt threatened by this
spectre of direct democracy and made
it clear that the citizens would be lis-
tened to, but that the members of the
Office,as elected representatives, would
remain the only actors who could legiti-
mately give advice to government.
Throughout their eight page document
announcing the conference COPECST,
1998a), they repeatedlystresse d that the
panel was not representative of the
French population, and that th.e confer-
ence was no substitute for political de-
cision making. The dominant view of the
conference was of a one-way process of
education from experts to citizens. The
emphasis was on how the conference
would facilitate public understanding of
biotechnologies, and the OPECST
stressed the role of the consensus con-
ference as a catalyst for a broad er debate,
relayed by the press, which would en-
lighten public opinion (Table 2). There
was no mention of any impact on deci-
sion making. Only one sentence in this
document referred to any effect of the
conference on policy makers:
Consensus conferences should con-
tributetomakepoliticaldecision-mak-
ers awareofthe importance and com-
plexities of some decisions that they
have to make. (po3).
Furthermore, there was absolutely no
reference to the fact that the scientific
experts might themselves, by participat-
already been established? That the
public debate, as it was occurring,was
not manipulated by pressure groups of
whatever kind? The idea was therefore
not to directly organise the 'big national
debate' announced by the Govern-
ment, but to establish the conditions
for a mini-debate (the one we were or-
ganising) that would take place inde-
pendently and would bring out the
points to be discussed and that in this
way the general public debate would be
reoriented, without allowing this re-
orientation to be manipulated by any-
body. And especially not by the organ-
isers of this mini-debate, that is by us.
(Roqueplo, 1998:6-7)
As soon as one considers totally new subjects such as the emergence of
transgenic plants, the advice of experts, which often increases the perplex-
ity of political or economic decision-makers, can only constitute one ele-
ment of the debate. In this case, the debate is indeed far more complex
since one needs to establish new social norms and to facilitate the under-
standing, by the public, of the stakes involved in the technological debate.
Knowledge about the limits of the social acceptability of innovations are
today an essential criterion that one can no longer escape, but the prob-
lem which remains is how to manage to generate a debate that can en-
lighten public opinion. Consensus conferences cannot in themselves re-
solve this dilemma, since the opinion of fifteen citizens cannot be a substi-
tute to public debate; they can, however serve to initiate this debate and to
launch in on a sound basis (... ) It is therefore via the public debate that
these conferences can become part of the decision-making procedures.
They do not, indeed, aim to establish a direct pseudo-democracy where
the will of public opinion would become a substitute for political decision-
making. One must not forget that, sometimes, great scientific and techno-
logical advances were made despite very intense reactions of public opin-
ion. (... ) In a representative democracy, politicians often have to play the
role of an enlightened leader with respect to the rest of the population, but
they still need to be themselves enlightened about the real consequences
of the choices they have to make. Consensus conferences and the public
debate which should follow must indeed contribute to make these politi-
cians aware of the importance and the complexity of some of the decisions
they have to make.
ing in this conference, reconsider their
opinions, their roles and the scientific
framing of their advice in risk regulation
processes. This possibility is considered
by a number of social scienceresearch-
ers to be one of the most important and
potentially beneficial functions of pub-
lic participation in risk management and
technological assessment (ESRC, 1999;
Levidow, 1998; Marris, 1999; Purdue,
1995; Stirling, 1999, Wynne, 1987). In-
deed, these authors argue that public
participation should aim to help elicit
the narrow framing of risk tacitly used
by scientific experts, including the often-
inadequate treatment of uncertainty,
and to challenge the implicit social and
ethical dimensions incorporated into
their evaluations.
Over the period during which the con-
ference was organised (January-June
1998), a distinction was increasingly
made by Le Deaut and the steering com-
mittee between the consensus confer-
ence itself and the public debate as a
larger process, even though in the Gov-
ernment statements of November 1997
the two were clearly synonymous. One
of the members of the steering commit-
tee insisted on this pointin his post-con-
ference evaluation:
The steering committee also insisted on
the" increasingly passionate" dimension
of the existing GMO debate and sug-
gested that it was necessary to better un-
derstand the "deep feelings of the popu-
lation" (OPECST, 1998a: 4). The aim was
therefore to exclude views considered to
be "extreme", and to recruit "average"
citizens which would by definition (and
selection) not have any personal inter-
est in the development, or not, ofGMOs.
The existing debate was seen to be bi-
ased and not representative of the sen-
timents of "real" French citizens. In this
way, the consensus conference aimed to
reorient the debate away from estab-
lished and vocal stakeholders:
One point in particular must be
stressed: in order to prepare a public
debate which is not confiscated from
the start by one side or the other, the
procedure that we are experimenting
begins by snatching the debate away
from its usual protagonists" (OPEC5T,
1988b).The Government had announced a 'bignational public debate'. Of course, the
debate that we were organising was not
this big debate. So what was the idea?
To initiate the debate? Of course not,
since it was already initiated. But could
one be sure that it had been well initi-
ated? That all the important points had
Although such statements referred in
principle to all different stakeholders, it
seems that the main target was anti-
GMO non-governmental organisations.
It was felt that these NGOs had suc-
ceeded in getting their negativ€ evalua-
tion of these technologies wid<ely taken
up by the media, to the detriment of
more positive views.
The steering committee seemed ex-
tremely worried that the consensus con-
ference would somehow be manipu-
lated by established stakeholders. As a
result, they introduced several minor
modifications to the model prescribed
by the Danish Board of.Technology. All
of these aimed to increase their control
over the operations. Firstly, no stake-
holders were invited to join the steering
committee. Instead, it was composed of
the four scientists already involved as
advisors to Le Deaut for his broader in-
quiry (three biologists and one re-
searcher in law and science), comple-
mented by three social science research-
ers with an interest in relations between
science and society. Thus, the running
of this public participatory process was
left entirely to formal experts. Secondly,
no hearing of interested parties was
held, which is something that is also ad-
vised by the DBT and which might have
compensated to some extent for their
absence on the steering committee.
Thirdly, recruitment of the panel was
conducted by amarketing agemcy, rather
than by voluntary applications following
advertisements in the press. The com-
mittee felt that using the press "would
surely have produced submarines ma-
nipulated by the diverse pressure groups
interested in GMOs" (Roqueplo, 1998: 6).
Apart from these modifications, the pro-
cedures described in the DBT "rulebook"
were followed very closely (e.g. DBT,
1999; Joss and Durant, 1995).
The first two modificatio ns intro-
duced by the steering committee, and
the sentiment expressed by the third,
had a major impact on the way in which
environmental and consumer NGOs
perceived the consensus conference. It
created a generalised feeling of suspi-
cion and antagonism among these 01'-
ganisations; which was exacerbated by
the lack of communication by the
OPECSTduring the whole preparatory
phase. The atmosphere of confidential-
ity surrounding the conference was also
commented upon by journalists and so-
cial science researchers interested in
studying the process (e.g. Fernandes,
1998).At first LeDeaut planned to keep
secret the names of the members of the
steering committee and of the teachers,
in order to protect them from external
pressure. In the end, follOWingpressure
from environmental NGOs (Agir pour
I'Environnement, 1998), the list of com-
mittee members was published, and
press releases containing the names of
the teachers were published following
each of the two preparatory weekends.
In addition, all the training sessions and
the final public conference were video-
taped, but only made available after
completion of the conference.··Further-
more, despite several proposals by dif-
ferent groups of social science research-
ers, and the fact that the experimental
nature of this conference was frequently
stressed by the organisers, the Office re-
fused to set up an official evaluation of
the conference. The videotapes do not
on their own enable a detailed analysis
of the process, such as that conducted
by Joss (1995) or Mayer et al. (1996).
Apart from the presentation document
published by the OPECSTaround March
1998(OPECST,1998a), the verbatim citi-
zen panel report, and two brief and fac-
tual (undated) press releases published
following each of the two preparatory
weekends, no other public documents
were produced by the OPECSTabout the
conference. Commentaries have how-
ever been published by social scientist
members of the steering committee
(Boy,1999;Roqueplo, 1998).
cluded from the process.
5. The panel would not be aWareofsome
of the NGOs which were very active
with regard to GMOs, due to their
small size and lack of public visibility.
The panel should be provided with in-
formation about these groups, other-
wise they would only invite large 01'-
ganisations such as Greenpeace and
the National Consumers' Union.
Reactions by Non-governmental
Organisations
Feeling that they were being specifically
excluded, several key environmental
NGOs rl.idnot trust the process and re-
fused to participate in the process (e.g.
Ecoropa, 1998).The main critiques ema-
nating from NGOswere as follows:
1. The procedure was not democratic
enough: 15 citizens could not repre-
sent the whole of the French popula-
tion. This was exacerbated by suspi-
cions about the role of the market re-
search agency in the recruitment of
the panel, and the lack of any infor-
mation about the criteria that would
be used. Areferendum was often pro-
posed as a more democratic alterna-
tive.
2. The majority of the persons involved
in the organisation of the conference
were felt to be either pro-biotechnol-
ogy and/or involved in the develop-
ment of GMOs. This included the
OPECST,LeDeaut, the members of
the steering committee and the teach-
ers.
3. Regardless ofwho provided the infor-
mation provided during the prepara-
tory week-ends, it could never be con-
sidered to be neutral. A better alter-
native would be to present conflicting
information proVided by different
stakeholders.
4. NGOs were being purposefully ex-
Ironically perhaps, these non-govern-
mental organisations were, just like the
organisers, also concerned about the
potential manipulation of the panel
members by people with interests to
defend. But in their case they were con-
cerned about the undue influence of
pro-GMO individuals. Thus, neither the
organising committee nor the NGOs
seemed prepared to recognise the inher-
ent common sense of "ordinary citizens"
and their ability to participate actively in
the process of technology assessment.
Both were proved wrong. From the start,
during the preparatory weekends, as
well as the final conference, the mem-
bers of the panel demonstrated that they
were willing and able to take an active
role in the process, interrupting their
"teachers" and the experts and making
them return to the points which they
considered important. This seemed to
have surprised all observers, including
the organisers (Roqueplo, 1998:10)and
owed them newspaper headlines such
as: "Citizens discourteous in the face of
specialists" (Liberation, 22nd June 1998).
Yetalook at consensus conferences con-
ducted preViously in other countries
would have demonstrated that this is a
usual outcome. Members of these pan-
els have always tended to take their re-
sponsibilities very seriously, work hard,
and are themselves extremely wary of
not being - or being seen to be - ma-
nipulated by stakeholders from any
sideS.
Another common misconception
among virtually all French stakeholders
prior to the conference was that the citi-
zens would deliver a clear for-or-against
verdict on the use ofGMOs. Industry and
some Government members feared this,
and anti-GMO non-governmental 01'-
ganisations hoped for it.Yetagain, a look
at previous consensus conferences
would have revealed that the typical out-
come is, just as it turned out to be in
France, a considered analysis 0fthe con-
ditions under which the panel members
feel the technology should be developed
and controlled in order to max:imise the
potential societal benefits and minimise
potential harmful impacts. Thus, rather
than announcing any verdict 0n specific
technological products, panel reports
tend to focus instead on institutional ar-
rangements surrounding their develop-
ment. This, indeed, is consisten.t with the
sociological analysis of public percep-
tions of environmental and technologi-
cal risks developed by BrianWynne and
colleagues (Grove-White et al., 1997;
Marris, 2000b;Wynne, 1987).
These misconceptions about the na-
ture of consensus conferences were
probably due to the novel nature of this
experience in France. They were, how-
ever, exacerbated by the fact that the 01'-
ganisers chose not to consult any per-
sons abroad who had direct experience
of consensus conferences, and not to
read any reports produced by previous
conference panels. This decjsion was
again based on the organisers' notion of
independence: they felt that such con-
sultations would influence them un-
towardly.
There is no major agricultural biotech-
nology industry in France (Joly and
Nesta, 1999). The two most significant
biotechnology firms are Rhone- Poulenc
and Limagrain. Rhone-Poulenc is pri-
marily an agro-chemical and pharma-
ceutical company, and has, at least until
recently, showed relatively little interest
in agricultural biotechnologies. Lima-
grain, on the other hand, is primarily a
seed company, and has over the last 15
or so years invested heavily in plant bio-
technology. But compared to major
foreign firms in the world, and especially
in the USA, it is a rather small player.
Large multinationals such as Monsanto
and Novartis have, of course, branches
in France. Indeed the headquarters of
the Novartis section for arable crops is
located near Toulouse. Since this section
was very closely involved with the devel-
opment and promotion of the geneti-
cally modified Bt maize at the centre of
the GMO controversy in France, it was
in principle a major interested party.
As a whole, representatives from in-
dustry had not actively participated in
the public debate on GMOs before the
conference. Novartis was an exception,
but their participation in the debate was
rather forced upon them. The contro-
versy about their Btl76 maize height-
ened throughout 1996-1998, cumulating
in a direct action by members of the
Confederation Paysannes, a left-wing
farmers' trade union, to destroy seeds in
their warehouses in January 1997. When
the conflict escalated, they explicitly de-
cided to withdraw from any direct com-
munication with the public, and focused
instead on behind the scene lobbying
activities with other major stakeholders
in the food chain. When the public de-
bate on GMOs emerged during 1997 and
1998, Novartis and other industry rep-
resentatives in France privately com-
plained that American biotechnology
companies, and especially Monsanto,
had misjudged the political and cultural
climate in Europe and had inflamed the
situation with their attempts at soothing
communication campaigns. A major
publicity campaign was carried out by
Monsanto in all major newspapers and
weeklies during the spring of 1998. Al-
though this campaign had been planned
before the consensus conference was
announced, the coincidence was com-
mented upon negatively by many stake-
holders.
Industry stakeholders were not given
any better access to the conference proc-
ess than any other actors, but were
happy with this since it enabled them to
show that they had not influenced the
conference in any way. As a whole, there-
fore, they kept a low profile and simply
responded to requests by the OPECST to
provide experts for the final weekend.
Novartis, Monsanto, Rhone- Poulenc and
Limagrain were represented in the ex-
pert panels. Thus, all of these firms were
happy to delegate responsibility for the
public debate on GMOs to the govern-
ment and the OPECST. On the other
hand, they did follow very closely, and
with some trepidation, the final confer-
ence itself, and appeared very relieved
when the panel did not take a stronger
line for a moratorium.
The behaviour of the agro- food indus-
try was similar (Ioly, 2000). Danone and
Nestle both provided experts. Danone is
a French com pany that ranks within the
three largest food production compa-
nies in the world. During the conference,
they essentially took the line that they
were caught between, on the one hand,
biotechnology companies pushing GM
products onto them, and on the other,
consumers who did not wish to buy
them. They argued that the best solution
was labelling, and asked for clarification
of regulations in this respect. Food dis-
tributors took a similar but stronger line.
They also argued that GM products were
being imposed on them from actors up-
stream in the food chain. But some of
them also emphasised that they would
do everything in their power to make
sure that consumers were provided with
a real choice of products containing no
GM ingredients, regardless of the legis-
lation. This was particularly the case for
Carre four, which is the largest European
food distributor, and one of the largest
in the world. It also, significantly, pro-
duces its own-brand products.
After questioning a total of 27 invited
experts, the panel retired and spent 20
hours (over-night) drafting their report,
which was presented at a press confer-
ence on 22nd June. It was summarised
as a "yes but" by many observers. Thus,
the development of GMOs was not op-
posed per se, but the panel made a
number ofrecommendations about ac-
companying measures. They requested,
in particular:
1. "Clear, reliable and accountable" la-
belling policy, including the separa-
tion and traceability of GM and non-
GM products throughout the food
chain.
2. The participation of representatives
of society in the regulatory system.
3. New laws to ensure liability and re-
sponsibility in case of harm detected
in the future.
4. Greater investment in public sector
research on the ecological risks asso-
ciated with GMOs.·
5. Greater state funding for public re-
search in general.
6. More specifically, the panel requested
that antibiotic marker genes should
not be used for the construction of ge-
netically modified plants.
The citizens' report also stated that "un-
til these conditions are satisfied, part of
the panel believes that a moratorium
would be advisable". As discussed above,
this kind of statement is rather unusual
for a consensus conference panel. It was
probably encouraged by the fact that
several participants at the conference
(scientists as well as representatives
from the Green party, NGOs and the
Confederation Paysannes) urged the
panel to recommend such a morato-
rium. Furthermore, this quote is often
partially cited by anti-GMO activists,
without the first part of the sentence
which qualifies the statement and puts
the focus on the institutional arrange-
ments recommended by the panel.
Most of these points about the social
management of technology were not
new. They were very similar to the Gov-
ernment announcement of November
1997, and cover the main questions
raised by the public debate in 1996-1997.
One exception is the issue ofliability and
responsibility, which had not carried
much weight in the debate. The absence
of recommendations about patenting is
noteworthy. This issue, which had been
central to the debate about GMOs in
many countries, was not focused upon
during the conference. It only entered
the public debate in France during the
summer of 1998, prompted by the sig-
nature of the European Patent Directive
and stories about "Terminator" technol-
ogy. One can also note the absence of
any blanket rejection based on ethical
considerations, and of any take-up by
the panel of the argument "we need
GMOs to feed the (third) world", pro-
moted by many biotechnology firms.
Indeed the panel stressed their percep-
tion of the "gap between the public rela-
tions discourse of these firms and real-
ity",which they described as: "Multina-
tional companies take advantage oftheir
dominant position to offer farmers tech-
nologies which could in the long term
lead to into financial dependency".
Overall, however, the panel remained
within a very liberal frame: the final out-
come is to be regulated through the mar-
ket and relies on individual choice and
responsibility. The State is portrayed as
a key arbitrator, providing scientific ex-
pertise and legislation to protect con-
sumers and citizens against the excesses
of private firms.
Le Deaut submitted his report to the
OPECSTon 30th June 1998, and it was
adopted unanimously (LeDeaut, 1998b).
His position was that the use of GMOs
should be authorised, but that measures
should be taken to improve risk evalua-
tion procedures and information for the
consumer. In this respect, he broadly
supported most of the recommenda-
tions of the citizen panel. He stressed that
he had, through the consensus confer-
ence, consulted "ordinary French peo-
ple" as well as experts. Some stake-
holders have expressed doubts about the
extent to which LeDeaut's opinion could
have been influenced by the citizen
panel, since his report, based on 8
months of consultation with experts, was
completed just 6 days after the panel had
submitted their recommendations. The
citizen panel's report was, however, in-
cluded as an annex to LeDeaut's report,
and he referred to it frequently, pointing
out where he felt that his viewswere sup-
ported by the panel, and defending his
own opinion when itwas clearly contrary
to that of the panel. His recommenda-
tions went directly against the panel's
report on only two points. First, he made
a distinction between antibiotic resist-
ance marker genes which incorporate a
bacterial or a eucaryotic promoter se-
quenceG• He recommended that the first
be banned, but that the second be evalu-
ated on a case-by-case basis. Second,
Le Deaut differed from the panel with
regard to the nature of the institutional
relationship between expert and citizen
evaluations of GMO authorisations. Al-
though he agreed that greater represen-
tation from representatives of society
should be included in the evaluation
process, he argued that any "citizen com-
mission" should be clearly distinct from
the existing expert-based Commission
du Genie Biomoleculaire (CGB). The
panel had, in contrast, recommended
two sub-committees within the CGB.
scale use of GMOs; and increased trans-
parency for consumers and citizens".
Specific decisions or engagements were
as follows:
1. Some genetically modified crops
were considered to be more accept-
able than others, mostly based on a
judgment about their propensity to
transfer their genes to surrounding
wild plants. On this basis, genetically
modified maize would be authorised
but not GM oilseed rape or sugar
beet. Thus:
i. The commercialisation of two
new lines of GM maize would be
authorised7•
ii. A two-year moratorium would be
applied on the marketing and the
cultivation of GMplants "such as
oilseed rape, which present a risk
of crossing with other species".
iii. GM plants containing antibiotic
resistant genes would be consid-
ered on a case-by-case basis. De-
spite the concern expressed by the
citizen panel, the risk was consid-
ered to be minor, especially com-
pared to the increase in antibiotic
resistance caused by the use of an-
tibiotics in human and veterinary
medicine, and in animal feed.
2. Measures would be taken to ensure
"transparent and pertinent" informa-
tion for consumers. This included a
commitment to the labelling of GM
food products and to setting up ana-
tional system for the traceability of
GMplants.
3. Biovigilance would be reinforced,
and the risk evaluation procedures
for GMOs would be reformed in or-
der to increase transparency.
These positions were essentially the
Government GMO Policy
Following the Conference
On 30th July 1998, the Government an-
nounced its position "based on these
[OPECSTj initiatives" (Prime Minister's
Office, 1998).Government policy would
be based on three key principles: "strict
application ofthe precautionary princi-
ple; a necessary vigilance for the large-
same as those announced by the Gov-
ernment in November 1997.High-rank-
ing civilservants stated in our interviews
that the Government felt that their po-
sition had been backed up by the citi-
zen panel. For them, the simftlitude in
policy between November 1997 and July
1998 should not be taken to reflect any
lack of influence of the consensus con-
ference. Our interpretation of events is
that rather innovative decisions - which
signalled a change from public GMO
policy prior to 1997- were taken by the
Government in November 1997, and
that the consensus confere!l1ce con-
firmed that these decisions were in line
with citizen expectations. Thus, the Gov-
ernment responded to the conference by
reinforcing its existing policy :along the
same lines. In terms of labelling and
traceability they even went further than
they had before. Furthermore, the
French Government decided to defend
these controversial positions in interna-
tional trade negotiations withjn the EU
and with the USA.Most spectacularly, in
June 1999, the French delegaUon at the
European Council ofMinisters called for
- and in effect obtained - the suspension
of further authorisations for the com-
mercialisation of genetically modified
crops and foods in the EU (Marris,
2000a). The French Government also
defended this position during negotia-
tions to establish EU policy prior to the
WTO meeting in Seattle in November
1999. In doing so, the Government was
well aware that it was jeopardising both
the construction of the EU as a unified
political and economic union. as well as
relations between the EU and its trade
partners, especially the USA.The main
arguments used by the French Govern-
ment to support a freeze on GMOs re-
lated to the inadequacy oflabelling and
traceability rules; the need to establish
a tighter and more transparent risk as-
sessment framework; and also simply
the "need to restore public and market
confidence" (Council ofMinisters, 1999).
The precautionary principle has also fre-
quently and increasingly been stated as
prescriptive guidance (e.g.Kourilskyand
Viney,1999).The more recent French de-
cisions regarding the non-lifting of the
ban on British beefrepresents an exten-
sion and hardening ofthis policy to other
environmental and health risks.
Athome, however, nothing much has
visibly changed, so far, in the institu-
tional arrangements for the evaluation
and management of GMOs since the
consensus conference. Furthermore,
Government support for research in ag-
ricultural biotechnology has not been
altered, and has continued to promote
closer links between the private and
public sector. For example the establish-
ment ofGenoplante, a majorpublic-pri-
vate joint venture in the field of plant
biotechnology has gone ahead despite
significant criticism from p~blic sector
scientists.
The strong statements with regard to
setting up a system of traceability for
genetically modified food products,
made in November 1997and developed
further in July 1998, have not yet been
implemented. Follow-up so far has con-
sisted mostly of - substantial - expert
feasibility studies about the technical
procedures that would need to be estab-
lished and their economic cost. In addi-
tion, the Secretary of State for Consumer
Affairswas, in March 1999, assigned by
the Prime Minister the task of develop-
ing a labelling and traceability system
which would reflect the demands of the
panel. Longer term evolutions can there-
fore be anticipated.
The second main pledge by the Gov-
ernment was about the organisation of
scientific expertise, and in particular
about increasing the transparency ofthe
regulatory system. Amajor reform of the
Commission du Genie Biomoiecuiaire
has been discussed since the autumn of
1997.The aim would be to increase the
participation of representatives of civil
society and to make its activities more
transparent, and this was clearly sup-
ported by the citizen panel. The mem-
bership of this committee was renewed
in June 1998 (prior to the conference),
following usual administrative proce-
dures. The new members did represent
a broader range of scientific experts, and
the comitology rules of the CGB have
changed significantly. But no major re-
form has yet been undertaken to in-
crease public participation, although
this is still being discussed in political
circles.The biovigilance committee con-
tinues to exist, and was more perma-
nently inscribed in legislation in July
1999.But since next to no GMcrops are,
or have been, cultivated in France its
work has inevitably been limited. On the
other hand, GMOshave continued to be
cultivated in the context of experimen-
tal releases and large-scale farm trials.
And despite repeated Government dec-
larations about improving transparency
and unrelenting requests from environ-
mental NGOs, access to information
about these releases (including their pre-
cise locations) remains severely re-
stricted.
Substantial new public research funds
have however been made available for
the evaluation ofthe impacts of the cul-
tivation ofGMOs. Significantly, the stud-
ies commissioned include potential ef-
fects which were previously deemed ac-
ceptable or irrelevant when genetically
modified crops were granted approval
(Levidow et ai., 1996, 1997, 1999 and
2000; Roy, 2000; Roy and Joly 2000). In
particular, indirect impacts are explicitly
taken into account, such as modifica-
tions induced byGMOson farming prac-
tices and on the whole agro- food sector.
So are cumulative effects such as the
impact of multiple gene insertions
within the same GM crop, or of the use
of several different GM crop varieties
within a farming system over several
years. The possible effect of the genetic
modification process itself on the struc-
tural and functional stability ofgenomes
are also emphasised. Furthermore, the
impacts to be investigated include not
only health and environmental risks but
also social and economic consequences
(MENRT,1999).
It is very difficult to measure the pre-
cise extent of the influence of the con-
sensus conference on public policy, es-
pecially since the Government never ex-
plicitly responded to the citizens' report.
One should take care, however, to dis-
tinguish between immediate and longer
term impacts. Although Government
decisions taken weeks after the confer-
ence did not distinctly follow-up on the
panel's recommendations, public policy
developments in France since July 1998
do seem broadly consistent with the citi-
zen's requests. And so do important on-
going initiatives. When analysing the
impact of the conference, one should
therefore not focus solely on immediate
and direct consequences. The confer-
ence is best seen as one element in more
complex and long term decisional proc-
esses. We conclude that the conference
consolidated the policy line which was
emerging from the new left-green Gov-
ernment prior to the conference. The
foundations of all the - rathell' innova-
tive - developments in public policy on
GMOs described above were apparent,
at least in our interviews, prior to the
consensus conference. This does not,
however, imply that the confex:ence had
no effect. It provided important added
legitimacy for these prior initiatives
which were not universally -accepted
within government beforehan.d.
Furthermore, the fact that the confer-
ence actually happened, regardless of
any direct effect of the citizens' recom-
mendations' has been very significant.
From November 1997,when the confer-
ence was announced, until June 1998,
when the process was completed, a very
high level of uncertainty prevailed. Pub-
lic policy on GMOs was essentially on
hold and stakeholders felt that almost
anything was possible. Industry feared
that biotechnological developments
might be restricted, whereas anti-GMO
activists hoped that the panel would
support their call for a moratorium. Me-
dia coverage on GMOswas high during
this period and focused mostly on the
pros and cons of the technology, and on
the positions of different actors, rather
than on the consensus conference itself
(Lemarie and Joly, 2000).This provided
an important space for all major stake-
holders, including many who had not
been involved in the debate before, to
position themselves with regard to
GMOs. Existing stakeholders were also
forced to reappraise or explicit their po-
sitions. The nature of the network of in-
stitutions involved in the GMO debate
was therefore radically modified. This
was particularly true on the side of anti-
GMO activists: new non-governmental
organisations emerged, and novel coa-
litions between existing ones were estab-
lished. Industry actors, especially food
distributors, also developed more ex-
plicit positions. INRA,the major national
agricultural public research institution
published, for the first time, a dossier on
GMOs.These key developments in the
public scene surrounding GMOs are
likely to have long-lasting effects on the
controversy which go far beyond the
consensus conference itself.
This case study has revealed an inher-
ent tension within all attempts at in-
creasing citizen participation in public
decision-making within post-modern
societies. On the one hand, on the side
of the French government and parlia-
ment, there is a sincere political will to
consult citizens and insert them more
directly in public decision-making. This
shift is largely due, as in other western
democracies, to the observed "demo-
cratic deficit", i.e. the fact that citizens
increasingly feel that they a~e not well
represented by their public institutions.
This is despite the fact that there are in
fact more and more institutions devoted
to public wellbeing at the international,
national, regional and local levels.
France has itself been through signifi-
cant reforms over the last decade to de-
centralise public institutions. In this
context, the citizen's conference did rep-
resent a deliberate experimental inno-
vation for a new form of "bottom-up"
governance. On the other hand, French
administrative practice is inherently
"top-down", and remained so during this
exercise.Thus, the way in which citizens
were consulted was, paradoxically, en-
tirely consistent with the top-down re-
publican State view of governance,
founded on electoral legitimacy. The
State, embodied by the OPECSTand in
particular by Deputy Le Deaut, was,
throughout the exercise, the only legiti-
mate representative of the people.
Within French political culture, the
concept of the State is something much
wider, and indeed distinct from, parlia-
ment or government. The State is non-
partisan, objective and, by definition,
serves the public good. It is 'of the peo-
ple', but also 'above the people'. Thus,
although citizens may disagree - indeed
are expected to disagree - on important
societal topics, it is entirely legitimate for
the State to settle an important political
issue by taking a unilateral decision. This
will not usually be challenged by the
French population. In this way, the State
in effect establishes societal consensus.
Indeed the OPECST emphasises the
non-partisan and consensual nature of
its decisions: "It is important to note that
decisions by the Officeare almost always
taken unanimously, the Office being
characterised by the consensual charac-
ter of its positions" (OPECST,2000).
This is particularly ironic because,
despite the antagonism which devel-
oped between the promoters of the con-
ference and some environmental NGOs,
there was one point on which all stake-
holders and observers agreed: in France,
the procedure could under no circum-
stances be called a "consensus confer-
ence",because this would imply a heavy-
handed manipulation of the process.
The French conference was therefore
called a "Citizens' Conference" ("con-
ference de citoyens"). The organisers
failed to notice that even in Denmark,
where the name was coined, these con-
ferences do not require that the panels
necessarily arrive at a consensus. The
Danish Board ofTechnology guidelines
state that: "The preparation of the final
document is a process in which, through
an open discussion, an effort is made to
attain the widest consensus between the
laymen on the initiatives and actions to
be recommended. Minority opinions
should only be allowed where the proc-
ess reveals verywide differences ofopin-
ion" (DBT,1999, p.5). According to the
facilitator for the French consensus con-
ference panel, the instructions given to
the French panel were in effect identical
to those proposed by the DBT.
Asking the members of the panel to
come to a consensus was considered to
be contrary to republican ideals of
equality and freedom. This reflected the
fact that the French republican model of
democracy is based upon the idea of
debate between citizens with equal
rights. The belief that people are free to
choose and think what they want is pri-
mordial. In France, self-identity is gen-
erally constructed on the basis of intel-
lectual and discursive differentiation be-
tween individuals, even though this does
not necessarily reflect substantive differ-
ences. Itwas therefore assumed that the
panel would debate without agreeing.
Indeed the French term used was "debat
contradictoire", which emphasises un-
derlying conflict. In this context, it was
necessary to invoke the State.The essen-
tial role of the State would be to estab-
lish the nature of the disagreements. It
would be a neutral actor, providing in-
formation and organisational action.
Citizens could and should participate in
a "debat contradictoire" but the State,
which is by definition supposed to serve
the interests of citizens in an impartial
manner, would then be entitled to settle
the question.
This explains why it was so important
for those involved to emphasise the
separation between State, as an impar-
tial actor, and government, a partial one.
It also explains the decision to exclude
organised stakeholders from the process
itself, since these were considered to be
too partisan. University professors and
public sector researchers, as State serv-
ants, were on the other hand legitimate
candidates as teachers for the prepara-
tory weekends and as members of the
steering committee. Therefore, although
the idea of consensus was considered to
be abhorrent, in practice rivaldiscourses
were explicitly excluded from the under-
lying process. The State re mained,
throughout this experiment in public
participation in technology assessment,
the only actor which could legitimately
advise government.
With respect to the conference, and as
President of the OPECST,LeDeaut was
considered to be a representative of this
impartial State. Within French republi-
can culture the fact that he was also a
Member of Parliament from the politi-
cal party in power was perfectly accept-
able. It was as a State servant that he
could legitimately synthesise the panel's
arguments and integrate them within his
broader OPECSTinquiry. Through him,
the State consulted and listened to the
opinions of citizens and representatives
of civil society. But rather than transfer-
ring these directly to decision-makers,
LeDeaut took on a central role as a neu-
tral intermediary, synthesising these
opinions and presenting them to parlia-
ment. It was then up to government,
through its elected representatives, to
decide on the course of action. This
rather top-down vision of the procedure
was shared bymost participants, includ-
ing the citizen panel itself. It was only
challenged by a small number of envi-
ronmental NGOs,and then only because
the organisers were not seen as impar-
tial enough, and therefore not exemplary
representatives of the State. The NGOs
criticised the conference on the grounds
that the citizens would be influenced by
the personal and institutional interests
of the organisers and teachers involved
in the preparatory sessions. They argued
that they, as stakeholders, should be
more closely involved in order to estab-
lish a more balanced view of contradic-
tory arguments. They did not, in con-
trast, focus on the idea that citizens
should be better enabled to frame the
issues as they pleased.
A similar observation can be made
about the recently established Commis-
sion Nationale du Debat Public. This in-
stitution was created in 1997in response
to increasingly difficult to resolve con-
troversies between local residents and
state engineers with regard .~omajor in-
frastructure projects such as roads, rail-
way lines, waterways and dams. It aims
to stimulate local public debate. But the
commission is national and mostly com-
posed of representatives of top-down
rather than bottom-up institutions. Only
two NGOs (one consumer and one en-
vironmental) are represented, and both
are national organisations rather close
to the State. The other members are all
from technocratic and public institu-
tions such as senior judges, elected May-
ors, members of parliament, and the
national railway company. This Com-
mission is therefore structured around
national institutions, and yet it decides
when, where and how a local debate
should take place (Blatrix, 1997).
This republican concept of an impar-
tial State also, interestingly, fits in well
with a particular view of technology as-
sessment which is not specifically
French. According to this view, there is
objective, neutral information about sci-
ence and technology on one hand, and
partisan, biased opinion on the other.
Thus science, just like the State, has a
"natural" authority founded on its im-
partiality. This view, which is shared by
the OPECST,led to a particular frame for
the consensus conference. French pub-
lic institutions are permeated by tech-
nocratic members of the grand corps
and this obviously influences their
dominant view of science and technol-
ogy. For example, the way in which the
preparatory weekends were conceived
implied that there existed an objective
view of biotechnology which could be
transferred neutrally to citizens, via State
servants, i.e. "disinterested scientists"
such as university professors and pub-
lic sector scientists. These information
sessions were considered by the organ-
isers to be of an entirely different nature
from the conference itself, were "real
debate", involving controversies and par-
tisan positions, would occur.
The French conference was also
framed by the associated notion that
there can be a neat separation between
public and private sector science. Ac-
cording to this notion, public science is
"pure" and "neutral" and serves the pub-
lic good. Privately funded research, on
the other hand, is considered to be by
definition biased and serving commer-
cial interests to the detriment of societal
benefits. The vision was strongly sup-
ported by the public sector scientists
who participated in the preparatory ses-
sions and the conference itself; and it
was readily taken up by the panel, who
recommended that more State funding
be devoted to biotechnology research in
order to "guarantee its independence
with regard to private sector research
and the influence of multinationals". It
was also taken for granted that risk as-
sessments should only be carried out by
public institutions. Indeed at times dur-
ing the conference debate this seemed
to be the only legitimate role for public
science, which would in this way serve
as a safeguard against the excesses of
private science. The idea that public sec-
tor scientists should, or indeed do, con-
tribute to technological advances was
largely absent. This was despite the fact
that previous and ongoing governmen-
tal policy was pushing public sector sci-
entists to collaborate more extensively
with the private sector, in particular
within the field of biotechnology (Ioly
and Nesta, 1999).The French public sec-
tor for scientific research has until now
remained, in comparison to trends in
other countries, relatively large and iso-
lated from the private sector. It seems
that some public sector scientists used
the opportunity created by this confer-
ence to fight against such trends, and
sought to reestablish the importance of
independent research conducted by
public scientific institutions. In addition
the panel also gladly embraced the no-
tion "retard technologique", which is a
key feature in French debates on tech-
nological development. The argument is
that France needs to accelerate the pro-
motion of R&D in order to keep up or
catch up with foreign competitors, espe-
cially the USA; otherwise France will
loose its independence and will suffer
detrimental economical consequences.
This vision of two distinct types ofsci-
ence also excludes the more fundamen-
tal idea that there is such a thing as sci-
entific culture which permeates both
private and public sector scientific insti-
tutions and which, through technologi-
cal developments, influences wider
societal processes. This institutional and
cultural framing set important limits on
the French consensus conference, in
particular with respect to the extent to
which the notion of technological pro-
gress in itself could be challenged. There
was little or no scope within the confer-
ence process to challenge, or even dis-
cuss, the meaning of scientific and tech-
nological development and its relation-
ship with social and cultural processes.
Thus, although the French institutional
and cultural context is significantly dif-
ferent from the UKcontext, one can say,
following Levidow (1998) that the Citi-
zen Conference served to "technologize
democracy" rather than to "democratize
technology". Interestingly, this critique
was not mentioned in France, even by
environmental NGOswho opposed the
conference. Only one small group of ac-
tivists with seemingly anarchist leanings
developed this argument to some extent,
and coined the term "genetically modi-
fied democracy" (Anon, 1998). But, de-
spite some very visible direct actions,
this group was unanimously rejected by
all other stakeholders and their dis-
course has found absolutely no space in
the French public debate.
One must, however, remember that
this was a first experiment and that the
organisation of a consensus conference
did reflect a broader ongoing evolution
in French institutions, especially with
regard to public input into decisions on
technological and environmental issues
(Blatrix, 1997; Ioly et al. 1999; Las-
coumes, 1997; Ministry for the Environ-
ment, 1999; Piechaczyk, 1997). Institu-
tional cultures do not change overnight,
but can evolve over time. Indeed it seems
clear that the persons who learnt the
most from this process, and who found
their own prior judgments most chal-
lenged, were not so much the citizens
but the experts and politicians; i.e. mem-
bers of the steering committee, the ex-
pert panels and relevant ministries.
We have conducted focus group re-
search which reveals that members of
the general public were essentially una-
ware of the conference (Joly, 2000;
Marris, 2000b). Although, overall, they
tended to think it was a good idea when
they were told about it, they felt that the
fact that they had not known about it
revealed that it did not represent a sin-
cere desire for a real debate with soci-
ety. It would probably take many repeti-
tions before such a process was consid-
ered to be significant by the French
population. But it does seem likely that,
given ongoing societal developments
with regard to risk and th~' democratic
deficit, experiments of this kind will be
repeated. Citizens are therefore, in effect,
forcing top-down political structures to
reform. One can therefore envisage in
the longer-term a converging co-evolu-
tion between the institutions involved
and members of the general population
which would lead toward more effective
and challenging public participation in
technology assessment.
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